December 10, 2013
Apparently I wasn't done with Syria's chem attack yet
There's been a lot of discussion on this, with Sy Hersh weighing in recently, so it's time to revisit. Short story, Syrian government culpability still seems clear from here, but the evidence has taken some twists and turns that are worth commenting on (if only because my graphic several posts below now turns out to have been based on inaccurate UN reporting and would appear to have been disappointingly misleading). Below the fold is a detailed analysis of the recent findings on this, and why I would argue the preponderance of evidence still points at the Syrian army as the culprit.Continue reading "Apparently I wasn't done with Syria's chem attack yet"
September 17, 2013
Probably final Syria chem thought
What's really interesting about the Syrian chem attack, analytically speaking, is that it's one of those rare situations where the two of the most reliable intuitive principles we have are completely at odds. The Cui Bono assessment of this is that the Syrian government would have to be incredibly stupid or reckless to attack their own people this way. The Occam's Razor hypothesis points now, entirely at their having done so.
Syria attacks: also note the quantity required
HRW's Peter Bouckert raises another good point:
The rocket systems identified by the UN as used in the attack – truck-launched 330mm rockets with around 50 to 60 liters of Sarin, as well as 140mm Soviet-produced rockets carrying a smaller Sarin-filled warhead – are both known to be in the arsenal of the Syrian armed forces. They have never been seen in rebel hands. The amount of Sarin used in the attack – hundreds of kilograms, according to Human Rights Watch’s calculations – also indicates government responsibility for the attack, as opposition forces have never been known to be in possession of such significant amounts of Sarin.
Assume that only the two 330mm rockets the UN inspectors saw were involved. That would still be 100+ litres of sarin in those two rockets alone, not counting the BM-14s or any other munitions involved (estimates have actually suggested 20 or more munitions were used in this one attack). By comparison, the Aum Shinrikyo cult used a total of 5 litres in the Tokyo subway attacks, the only successful deployment of sarin in history by anyone other than Saddam's Iraq. (The Japanese cult released a similar amount in their previous 1994 Matsumoto attack, killing eight.) There is no question the apparatus required for the production here would have been significant. Interestingly, although sarin will kill you, no question, if a drop lands on unprotected skin, when distributed in the air, whether in Syria, Iraq or Japan, it takes roughly a litre of distribution per fatality. Sarin is not the deadliest chemical weapon out there; that honour probably belongs to VX, which the Syrians also have in smaller amounts, which is about 10 times as deadly, and persists longer in the environment (unlike Sarin, which sunlight rapidly degrades).
Note also that the production or transport of Sarin or its schedule 1 precursor chemicals is banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention, which both Russia and Iran have signed, and that sarin's shelf life is about the same as milk -- months.
September 16, 2013
Just two other points on the Syria attack
Updating entry below with 2 addenda:
1) The fact the two trajectories we have seem to converge may be coincidental, or maybe not. The high ground north and west of Damascus is held firmly by the Syrian government's Praetorians, the 4th Armored and Republican Guard Divisions, the best troops the government has left. That the rockets in question were launched from that area is telling in and of itself over how accountable the senior leadership would have been. If your key military supporters are the active party, you're either in the know or you've lost control: there's not really a third option. There is also some evidence of another launch point farther to the northeast along that same mountain ridge. Evidence of multiple simultaneous launch points in different divisional and brigade areas of operation would be an indication of higher level control or authorization of the attack, due to the coordination involved. If they were all in one unit's area you could write it off to a rogue commander perhaps, but here, maybe not so much.
2) Also note, these are tactical munitions. All unguided artillery rockets of around 10,000m range, probably directly controlled by their divisional commanders. The larger guided missiles that Syria has are not yet in play here. At the time, there was an interesting Turkish news story, saying the attack had been made by troops of 4th Armoured Division along with 155th Missile Brigade, the linchpin unit of the Syrians' strategic rocket force. The difference is the former is a ground unit, but the latter exists solely to counter-attack Israel in a standup fight, and has weapons with the range and accuracy to do it, some of them undoubtedly chemical in nature.
That story came out around the same time as the highly amusing piece of phone intercept evidence indicating government culpability where a Syrian defence official called the 155th in a panic after the attack demanding to know why they'd fired chemical missiles and an officer told him to come down and count them if he didn't believe they hadn't. The munition evidence recovered so far would seem to indicate the 155th officer was right. These weren't his.
But then, they wouldn't need to be. The attackers were trying to hit a Damascus suburb (not even really picky which one, at that), 10 km away, the same ones they shell with conventional artillery every other night, no strategic missiles or inertial guidance required. Even if successful, the effect achieved would have been purely tactical... depopulate and dehouse the hostile suburban populations south and east of the city... and the tactical commander for the defence of Damascus evidently felt or was told chemical weapons would help with that objective. Which makes it even more baffling why the Assad regime would need to go this far, now. It simply doesn't seem worth it, unless of course things in Damascus seemed far more desperate to them than they did to us.
Syria attacks: since I still believe in fighting stupidity still, occasionally
What today's UN report on the Syrian Aug. 21 sarin attack states, and which they are prohibited from their mandate from pointing out in very clear terms, is that all the evidence points to this being a government attack. So for instance, the two measurable trajectories on the artillery rocket munitions used that the inspectors could make both point back to government-controlled areas. They are careful to point out there is clear evidence these were actual impacts too, rather than just being dropped there, and both associated with chemical attack symptoms in people who lived nearby. The graphic here shows the actual bearings the report gives (215 degrees and 105 degrees) with arrows exactly 5 miles long, pointing away from their likely points of origin, superimposed on a previous US State Department graphic showing the areas of control of the two sides fighting in Damascus. Pink is the government controlled zone. Note, that these aren't the only munitions, just the only ones that could have their trajectories assessed, that both are artillery types in the government's arsenal, and range estimates in these things are extremely approximate: all you have really have here to go on is direction. Still, the chances of this being some kind of attack by someone outside the Syrian government, already slim, basically have to drop to zero now, assuming you trust the UN's facts as presented. I'd say, "do I need to draw a map?" but I guess I just did.
Incredibly, the two rocket paths traced backwards actually converge right on Mount Qasioun, a mountain overlooking Damascus which the Syrian government has heavily fortified. You may remember Mount Qasioun... back in May Israeli jets blew up a huge quantity of "advanced surface-to-surface rockets" on the mountain they alleged were about to be transferred by the Syrian government to Hezbollah. The same mountain is also the location of the government's secretive Jamraya military research center, long rumoured to be central to the Syrian government's chemical weapons program.
The report also gives strong evidence that the attack on the Southwest suburb near the airport was by 2 or more 140mm artillery rockets of a known chemical-capable type, generally fired from a BM-14 launcher. The rocket that was fired into the eastern suburb is of 330mm calibre, a huge thing not previously seen outside of Syria, which some are calling the "bicycle pump" or the "UMLACA", meant to be fired out of a single-rocket tube from the back of a truck, the same launcher used for the Iranian-supplied Falaq-2 artillery rocket. Neither of the rebels' improvised artillery systems, the so called "Hell" spigot cannon or their improvised rocket-assisted mortar (IRAM), are consistent with what's seen in today's report.
For more analysis, the best blog source on this one at the moment is probably Brown Moses.
As for institutions like Reuters, via the Globe and Mail, articles like this one just show the usual reportorial, "I need a he-said-she-said" laziness in the face of factual evidence: "It is not immediately clear whether any of the details in the report suggested culpability." Come on guys, if I could get out the equivalent of a high school protractor, you could have, too. Google Earth does bearings now, and everything.
(As for the "maybe the rebels/Obama did it" false-flaggers, I really hope they stop now. The idea it could be rogue elements in the Syrian government, yeah that was always plausible, maybe still is even... but some of the other, crazier stuff out there had the preponderance of evidence against it weeks ago, and this is just cake-icing. You're embarrassing yourselves, people.
Syrian government forces attacked their own people with sarin gas last month, period, probably at least twice -- those Aug. 5 allegations which showed very similar munition profiles to the Aug. 21 attack certainly need to be assumed to be true, now, as well -- ... That fact in itself is not particularly surprising, and no one here is saying it means anyone needs to bomb anyone right now, but it is still as established a fact now as you're likely to get anywhere in the news today.)
That basically sums it up right there
Space Channel in Canada on Sundays is running all the Doctor Who eps, 10 at a time, running up to the 50th anniversary. It's been a fun couple of Sundays. I forgot how much "The Parting of the Ways" among others, can still move me, and how one particular scene always encapsulated for me both the new series, and a lot of my own internal monologues over all all the years this website's been around.
Oh yes; 5 years ago last week I had started work in Kandahar. I guess this is pretty much all I have to say about that right now.
JACKIE: Listen to me. God knows I have hated that man, but right now, I love him and do you know why? Because he did the right thing. He sent you back to me.
ROSE: But what do I do every day, mum? What do I do? Get up, catch the bus, go to work, come back home, eat chips and go to bed? Is that it?
MICKEY: It's what the rest of us do.
ROSE: But I can't!
MICKEY: Why, because you're better than us?
ROSE: No, I didn't mean that. But it was. It was a better life. And I don't mean all the travelling and seeing aliens and spaceships and things. That don't matter. The Doctor showed me a better way of living your life. You know he showed you too. That you don't just give up. You don't just let things happen. You make a stand. You say no.
November 09, 2012
Petraeus resigns over an affair with Paula Broadwell. You may remember Paula Broadwell.
Question: would Paula have gotten access to those declassified photos of the destruction of an Afghan village without her enhanced level of "access," or was it her blithe acceptance of what they actually showed? As I said back here, "the Arghandab district continues to mess with people's careers."
September 24, 2012
Lang on green-on-blue: not following
I quoted Pat Lang approvingly two posts below, but I don't follow him here:
General Allen can argue what he likes but the Taliban have found the key to a stratagem that will give the "coup de grace" to the Afghanistan COIN project.
I think Allen's point, that most of these attacks are from frustrated Afghan soldiers, not insurgents, really isn't arguable on any of the facts I've seen. My quibble is with Lang's causational fallacy. To say that an increasing number of Afghans, including soldiers, are buying into the insurgents' world view to the point of being willing to kill and die for it, even granting that view is being transmitted in as well propagated an information operation as they can make it, does not mean most of these green-on-blue events were in any way coordinated by them. In 90% of the cases it appears to be pure cultural, societal and religious friction in an incredibly heavily armed, exceedingly high stress environment. That alone can mark the failure of a mission without the Taliban being mostly fascinated bystanders, and calling it their "strategem" seems obfuscatory on Lang's part.
Further thoughts: Afghanistan, Mali
A Canadian army major of significant Kandahar-area experience writes thoughtfully, in reference to my post below:
I've generally thought that the overarching problem was we identified the wrong enemy. The enemy was (and perhaps still is) AQ, which is made up of Arabs following the teachings of fringe elements of the Muslim Brotherhoods. But we went after the Taliban. And HiG. And Haqqani. None of them were interested in exporting violence, and I don't actually think they were all that close to AQ either. And then we compounded the error by lacking unity of purpose and command, but that's a political and strategic problem that comes with coalitions. Heck, even the US couldn't agree on a common purpose between Enduring Freedom and ISAF. Actually, we probably exasperated the situation by helping the ISI further strengthen its influence in Pak, with long term consequences to be determined over the coming decades.
As far as training the ANSF, I really think we need to be more honest with ourselves.Continue reading "Further thoughts: Afghanistan, Mali"
September 17, 2012
Afghanistan: yeah, it's pretty much over
US suspends joint operations with Afghan army in wake of recent green-on-blues.
Militarily significant? Not as much as you'd think. But yeah... the mutual hatred and misunderstanding is clearly now at such intolerable levels it's difficult to see any way back even to where we were 3 years ago. As a veteran of this particular fight, I'm not surprised any more, but still disappointed. I wish the outcome could have been different, but not with the inputs going in. I hate to say it, but in retrospect the 2009 US surge into Afghanistan was pretty much a failure. What was needed then was a different vision, involving a radical drawdown of the Western presence and retrenching to what was achievable, if there was even any chance of salvaging anything long term by that point. My personal hopes that we had held the line in a dysfunctional environment until the US could get there in mid 2009 were basically shattered on the realization that that surge--with all of its trying to apply the Iraq surge template to a very different country--just made everything all the more dysfunctional still.
I will say one thing though, about the anonymous spox comment that "we can't trust these people." We never trusted them. Ever. Not as far as we could throw them. And they never trusted us in return. Maybe because that's because we grew the Afghan army too fast. Maybe that's because we had insufficient people we could mentor the right way, with all the cultural immersion and risk and unorthodoxy that entailed. Maybe that's because ultimately their war aims and ours were completely divergent, something we could never ever paper over. Maybe all of the above. But the trust was always something you could measure in a teaspoon. Hospitality? sure (at least by them); politeness? no doubt. But tangible, operationally-significant trust between fellow soldiers? Yeah, not so much.
See also Pat Lang.
UPDATE: In retrospect, the suspension of Afghan Local Police training was indicative.
September 13, 2012
On the embassy attacks
I'm not conceding that the Obama administration has been apologizing for America (it hasn't, that's another Romneylie). I'm just saying, given what is now known about the current hothead instigator sheltering behind rights he doesn't deserve, that the world as a whole probably deserves an apology from somebody about now.
May 02, 2012
Devastating F-35 takedown
Don't read this if you're still an F-35 fan. Choice quote: "A virtual flying piano, the F-35 lacks the F-16's agility in the air-to-air mode and the F-15E's range and payload in the bombing mode." See also this more detailed analysis.
Glastris on Romney-Bin Laden: exactly
Paul Glastris cuts to the point of whether Romney was misquoted in a recent Obama ad. Of course, Romney misquotes Obama constantly, to the point of entirely reversing what he's said in some cases, so the whole debate is rich. But yeah, I personally have no problem with people hearing the whole of Romney's actual remarks... specifically:
"Global Jihad is not an effort that is being populated by a handful or even a football stadium full of people. It is—it involves millions of people..."
Millions. Romney's position, as was Bush's, was that they could not afford to hunt the one person who had actually masterminded a significant attack killing Americans (and Canadians), because they had to fight a war instead with those millions of "jihadists" who hadn't attacked the U.S. yet. Far more than a football stadium's worth of hostiles, he said, mentioning Hamas and Hezbollah specifically.
The alternate, sane position has always been that you deter future attacks best by making continued survival as difficult as possible for anyone who has attacked you directly, first. And the millions will come around to the point of view that, whether you're hateful or not, attacking you isn't going to work out well for them, either.
There's no misquoting here. Romney was saying never mind Bin Laden, he's just one more bad Muslim like all the rest, just one more foot soldier in a global civilizational clash. He clearly wasn't, and retribution was both just and required (and undoubtedly effective in spooking other Bin Laden wannabes). Romney was a fool for saying otherwise then, and a fool he remains today.
See also James Fallows. He's right, you don't actually get to dodge wartime military service in France and then say "even [Lt (N)] Jimmy Carter."
April 16, 2012
Ah, the Killian memos
Texas Monthly takes 10,000 words to tell us absolutely nothing new of consequence about George Bush's Air National Guard service and the controversy around them. Stories about Bush's spotty military service basically stopped after Dan Rather aired a poorly vetted story based on obviously forged documents ("The Killian memos") and destroyed his reputation. As the story rightly points out, that meant all the questionable military service allegations about challenger John Kerry effectively went unanswered in the press. But the nut graphs of the assessment of the Killian memo forgeries is very misleading:
But the man officially credited with inspiring a fusillade of blog attacks was Harry MacDougald, known on message boards as Buckhead, a GOP lawyer in Atlanta... He specifically claimed that the memos used proportional spacing and superscripts that didn’t exist on typewriters of the early seventies...
In any case, MacDougald’s arguments about the documents turned out to be inaccurate. He acknowledged as much in an interview with me in 2008. And in a speech given that same year, Mike Missal, a lawyer for the firm that CBS hired to investigate its own report, said, "It’s ironic that the blogs were actually wrong. . . . We actually did find typewriters that did have the superscript, did have proportional spacing. And on the fonts, given that these are copies, it’s really hard to say, but there were some typewriters that looked like they could have some similar fonts there. So the initial concerns didn’t seem as though they would hold up."
The story does take pains to point out that the source's explanation of the memos relied on imaginary people, that no one else would offer any evidence supporting the memos' provenance, and that the man the memos named as Bush's commander was no longer in command on the date they were "written." Really, that should be enough to confirm this was a clear (and successful) attempt to fox CBS News.
But just to be clear, there has never been, nor ever will be, a plausible scenario where regular office memos in a small air force national guard office would have been created on the high-end printing house equipment that would have been necessary in 1973 to give the exact look of a Microsoft Word document from 2004, that was typed in on just any old PC lying around. But that was, and apparently remains, Rather's position, and Missal's, above. It's crazy talk, though, and any article that cited it as anything other than crazy talk, like this one, is just being wishywashy and dishonest.
UPDATE: See also Kevin Drum.
April 15, 2012
Tim Lynch: He's baaack... and, Afghan band camp
So Tim Lynch is blogging from Afghanistan again, and has some comments on this weekend's attacks and the announced ISAF "offensive" they were designed to pre-empt. Nice to read some clear-eyed assessment.
Meanwhile in Kandahar, old mentor hands will be no doubt pleased to know at least the war is going well for the 205th Corps band, which was in 2008-09 the most dangerous and disturbing thing about Corps headquarters... my god they were awful. The story, with the Afghan army sergeant who hides his profession and sneaks onto base to work, and bandsmen who are only there so they can stay off the firing line, regardless of any musical ability, warmed my heart. Finally an Afghan army unit in the news I could recognize (I remember the Camp Hero masjid tower behind them in the picture fondly, too). The below may just be the best military mentor quote ever:
And with money from a special U.S. fund for outfitting Afghan security forces, [CWO Tim] Wallace bought the band new instruments. He skipped woodwinds, American favorites that would likely be ruined by Kandahar’s dry, searing heat, and instead added a French horn and a tuba, though no one knows how to play them.
And yet Wallace, like other military mentors across Afghanistan, is learning that many of the stubbornest deficiencies here are not material, but institutional. A vivid illustration of the problem comes midway through practice, when [band leader Maj.] Nejrabi tells me he doesn’t hold high aspirations for his band.
"They don’t really like to be musicians," he says, nodding toward his men, who sit a few feet away, listening. "It’s an easy job, and they’re not going out on missions. They come out here to pass the time, make some money, and be safe."
As Nejrabi speaks, Wallace stares at him in disbelief. "He doesn’t know the first thing about leadership," Wallace tells me later. "Why is he saying that in front of them?" He shakes his head. “I have my work cut out for me."
All kinds of awesome there. The taxpayer money for instruments for the Afghan army that no one can play, the laconic assessment of the Afghan major, and the mid-tour Western mentor's insistence in marketing our way to victory, all tied up together... just beautiful.
"endearingly macho" -- Mark Steyn
"wonderfully detailed analysis" -- John Allemang, Globe and Mail
"unusually candid" -- Tom Ricks, Foreignpolicy.com
Bill & Bob
Ghosts of Alex