March 08, 2004

UN Legitimacy

Lack of UN approval has been cited as a problem in Iraq by an awful lot of people. Kerry would have worked really, really, really hard at getting the UN on board so we could have the maximum amount of legitimacy.

But, as the UN bombing soon proved, not only do we have different criteria than the UN on when military action is called for, we have different criteria on installation security and how many casualties are required before we tuck our tail between our legs and scamper for the exits.

I would truly be interested in Kerry's response to a hypothetical where France, Germany, and the UN all blessed the Iraq operation but afterwards turned tail and ran at the very beginning of the occupation due to very light casualties. Would that change the legitimacy of the operation and when and how would it lose legitimacy. And if it remained legitimate, why does it remain legitimate? Is their initial assent a permanent stamp of legitimacy?

If an initial assent maintains legitimacy throughout the operation, UNSC 1441's last chance provisions along with Saddam Hussein's proven lies subsequent to this mandatory UNSC resolution would seem to provide just such initial legitimacy. If initial legitimacy doctrine doesn't apply, wouldn't that mean that we should have turned tail when we lost a chopper or two in the Sunni Triangle? Does it mean that Italy should have withdrawn after its horrible losses in their barracks bombing disaster?

Why are we there now after taking many more losses than the UN took before it withdrew because of military danger? Would we still be there if it had been a Kerry presidency?

Posted by TMLutas at March 8, 2004 11:29 AM