Here’s how to cure the two main problems with Canadian parliamentary democracy with a single measure, without amending the constitution. You read it first in blogland. (But not necessarily in this part of it: see above.) Ready? It goes like this:
First, the two main problems I promised:
1) The existing electoral system distorts voter intentions, punishes parties that it would be healthier to encourage, encourages parties that it would be healthier to punish, and inevitably lacks dynamism.
We have three kinds of political parties: 1) first-tier national parties, like the Liberals, and also sometimes the PCs, historically; 2) second-tier national parties, like the NDP and the former PCs, most of the time; 3) regional grievance parties, like the Bloc and the former Alliance. The math of our electoral system rewards types 1 and 3, while penalizing type 2. If there is no rival type 1 party, the result, necessarily, is permanent cabinet dictatorship, in which the only real dynamism comes from internal struggles in the party in power. Which is what we see.
The extreme example of this going very wrong is the 1993 federal election. The numbers have been cited before, but they’re worth looking at again:
| national votes | seats | votes/seat | |
| Lib. | 5,647,952 | 177 | 31,909 |
| BQ | 1,846,024 | 54 | 34,186 |
| Ref. | 2,559,245 | 52 | 49,216 |
| NDP | 939,575 | 9 | 104,397 |
| PC | 2,186,422 | 2 | 1,093,211 |
2) The Senate is ridiculous.
The solution? Leave the Commons alone, and make the Senate the PR house of Parliament.
The advantage of proportional representation is that legislatures reflect voters’ intentions, at least as party preference is concerned, fairly accurately; the disadvantage is that it removes the healthy messiness of the present system of nomination meetings and constituency-based elections, while intensely centralizing power within parties.
In Canada, proposals for proportional representation always seem to involve tinkering with the House of Commons. Some schemes involve adding a number of PR-elected members to the existing total; some call for cutting the number of directly elected members to add a number of PR-elected members. However, given the amount of trauma, hand-holding and bloodshed that goes with a routine redistribution – look at Copps/Valeri or Parrish/Mahoney – these are not proposals that are ever going to get further than the poli-sci seminar/op-ed page level. Not going to happen.
The two systems have their strengths and weaknesses. Fortunately, we already pay for two houses of Parliament, and can afford to have two different systems - democratic systems, that is - for selecting their members.
For many of us, that’s an original thought. Senators for years have had a tacit bargain with Canadians: Tolerate us, and we won’t assert ourselves as we would if we were legitimate. The result is that Canadians aren’t used to having a working bicameral parliament with, you know, debates, meaningful votes, interaction between the houses and so forth.
Canadians have been brought up to think of the Senate as ridiculous, which it certainly is, and has been for generations. However, we pay for a bicameral legislature; we might as well get some use out of the other half of it. There’s nothing wrong with having an upper house – we’re just not used to the idea that it could have a point.
The Gigantic Hound’s Plan:
It’s simple, easy to explain, and would result in a defensible democratic institution.
It’s interesting to think through how such a system would work in practice.
The politics of the lists would be interesting to watch: the top dozen or so slots, for any party, would in effect be Senate appointments. The high-number slots would be a courtesy to long-serving party members, like being named to the U.S. Electoral College. The middle-numbered slots, (say 35-45 for the Liberals) could be filled with fire-and-brimstone Young Turks, who would grapple furiously to find ways to increase the party’s national vote by one or two per cent. Or a party could choose to only name 50 or 60 people.
In principle, everybody’s vote counts. You might as well vote for the NDP in Markham, or for the unite-the-right candidate in Hamilton East, if that’s what your convictions lead you to do. (In a dual-ballot system, in which voters would get a Commons ballot and also a party-preference ballot for the Senate, you could vote for the Bloc in Lethbridge.) There’s nothing wasted at all, at least as far as the Senate election is concerned.
Regional balance, perhaps. Western proponents of a triple-E-style elected Senate argue that the upper chamber should be regionally equal (although the skewed math involved would make the result undemocratic, to an extent). This would shift the decision over to the parties. Parties could weight their lists regionally, if they chose to; if they didn’t, supporters of regional equality could hold them accountable.
Sex balance, perhaps. Parties’ Senate lists could be made up of equal numbers of men and women; odd, even, odd, even, all the way down the list. Or not.
I only play a constitutional lawyer in blogland, but I would be interested to see whether a system of Senate elections could be brought in without a constitutional amendment.
The Constitution says:
24. The Governor General shall from Time to Time, in the Queen's Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, summon qualified Persons to the Senate; and, subject to the Provisions of this Act, every Person so summoned shall become and be a Member of the Senate and a Senator.
Under this system, the way in which a senator is deemed ‘qualified’ would be by being in an eligible position on a party list. To perpetuate the system, senators could be made to agree as a condition of appointment that at the end of the Parliament they would be deemed to have resigned. The Constitution neither requires nor impedes the election of senators.
Patronage implications. This is an interesting one. Which is better for a prime minister: a) to be able to name two or three people a year to the Senate, to sit more or less for life, or b) to be able to name, say, 45 people to the Senate, to sit until the next election? Which puts him in a more powerful position?
The migraine-inducing aspect of this plan has to do with the regional allocation of senators required by the Constitution:
Ontario by twenty-four senators; Quebec by twenty-four senators; the Maritime Provinces and Prince Edward Island by twenty-four senators, ten thereof representing Nova Scotia, ten thereof representing New Brunswick, and four thereof representing Prince Edward Island; the Western Provinces by twenty-four senators, six thereof representing Manitoba, six thereof representing British Columbia, six thereof representing Saskatchewan, and six thereof representing Alberta; Newfoundland shall be entitled to be represented in the Senate by six members; the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories shall be entitled to be represented in the Senate by one member each.
How to solve this one? I’m not sure. Nothing says that senators have to be from the province that they are deemed to represent, though the alternatives would invite a certain amount of derision. The most plausible solution is for the parties to come up with regionally balanced lists, with the understanding that there might have to be some fudging: someone from northern New Brunswick could be deemed to represent PEI, for instance. It’s no worse than some parachute candidates in the Commons have been.
Transition. Change will not come from above, Billy Bragg sang. And why would it?
There are two main obstacles:
1) The bill providing for the election of senators would have to pass the Senate;
2) The existing senators, who hold their seats constitutionally, cannot be made to resign.
How to deal with these problems? First, it should be remembered that many of the existing senators can be recycled on to the Senate lists, at least for the first four-year cycle. Many more could be bought off with patronage appointments; parole boards and boundary commissions await. It would be a bit grubby, but it would be in a good cause in the long run.
Also, many senators are approaching mandatory retirement in any case: 29 of them are in their 70s. (Ten are 74.) Sixty senators, or a majority, are 65 or older. Offer them a pension now, and see how many accept.
For the really determined holdouts, there’s always public derision.